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I. INTRODUCTION 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,1 Brown v. Board of 
Education,2 Gideon v. Wainwright,3 and Reynolds v. Sims4 are among the most 
renowned cases in American history. Although controversial when decided, 
these cases are now considered part of the essential fabric of American 
constitutional law. Like the Constitution itself, these decisions have iconic 
stature in our political culture. And like the Constitution itself, they are 
celebrated as hallmarks of American liberty by both the left and the right.  
Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds, however, share another trait. They 
are products of progressive constitutionalism. They could not have been decided 
                                                                                                                       
 * Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I am grateful to Gene Nichol, 
Richard Myers, Al Brophy, and Lou Bilionis for their comments on an earlier draft of this 
Article and to Marc Macenko and Katherine Slager for their research assistance.  
 1 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 4 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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the way they were had the Court in those cases adhered to conservative theories 
of constitutional interpretation such as originalism or judicial restraint. Barnette, 
Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds therefore raise potential challenges to the 
viability of conservative constitutional theory. Generally, the validity of an 
interpretive theory should rest on its internal merits, not its external results. But 
if a particular theory cannot explain decisions that are universally considered to 
be both correct and integral to the American system of justice, the question 
necessarily arises as to whether there is something lacking in that theoretical 
account.  
This Article explores the significance of Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and 
Reynolds as a basis for evaluating theories of progressive and conservative 
constitutionalism as methods of constitutional interpretation, focusing most 
specifically on the relationship between these decisions and originalism. Does 
the universal acceptance of these cases as hallmarks of American liberty suggest 
that a method of constitutional interpretation, such as originalism, that rejects 
these decisions is thereby inherently flawed? 
Part II of this Article provides the necessary background by outlining what 
is meant by progressive and conservative constitutionalism. Part III examines 
Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds and explains how the decisions follow 
from progressive, but not conservative, constitutionalism. Part IV then takes a 
closer look at the relationship between the four decisions and originalism. The 
section first investigates whether the decisions can be reconciled with 
originalism as either appropriate exceptions to the originalist account or as 
precedents that are so deeply embedded in constitutional culture that they might 
escape originalist scrutiny. Concluding that such reconciliation is unlikely, the 
section then tackles the central question: What do non-originalist decisions such 
as Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds reflect about the legitimacy of 
originalism as an interpretive theory?  
II. CONSERVATIVE AND PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A. Conservative Constitutionalism 
Conservative constitutionalism has two primary strands.5 The classic 
version is judicial restraint, in which courts are seen to have only a limited role 
in constitutional decision making.6 This strand of conservative thought was 
                                                                                                                       
 5 For a detailed discussion of the differing meanings of “conservative,” see Ernest A. 
Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1181–1203 
(2002). This Article employs the more commonly understood uses of the term in relation to 
approaches to constitutional interpretation.  
 6 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 
314–15 (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 207–08, 
211 (1985); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Is There a Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence?, 73 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2002). 
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most prominent in the years after the Warren Court7 and in the wake of such 
controversial cases as Roe v. Wade.8 In reaction to such decisions, 
conservatives9 argued that the Court should be far more deferential to political 
actors.10 As the judicial constraint conservatives saw it, judicial invalidation of 
the acts of elected officials was improperly counter-majoritarian because it 
substituted the decisions of courts for the decisions of the people acting through 
their representatives.11  
Perhaps recognizing that too great a commitment to restraint abdicates the 
essential role of the courts,12 conservatives in the 1980s, led by Robert Bork, 
Edwin Meese, and Antonin Scalia, developed a second strand of conservative 
constitutionalism that quickly became dominant in conservative legal thought.13 
That theory, of course, is “originalism.”14 Under this theory, courts should 
exercise judicial restraint unless the “original meaning” of the text requires 
                                                                                                                       
 7 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. 
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2012) (manuscript at 14–18) (on file with the Ohio State Law 
Journal) (discussing conservative political reaction to the Warren Court). 
 8 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 9 To be sure, this criticism was also joined by some liberals. See ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
208–09 (1962). 
 10 Id. at 214–15. It is worth noting that in addition to their being inconsistent with 
originalism, Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds are also in tension with the principle of 
judicial restraint because all four cases overturned the decisions of politically accountable 
bodies. See infra Part III. 
 11 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(stating that courts should not create new rights because they are “impatient of democratic 
change”). 
 12 See Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, The Framers’ Constitution, 
DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS, Summer 2011, at 61, 62–63, available at 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/21/the_framers_constitution.pdf (“The Framers 
intended courts to play a central role in addressing these concerns. When proponents of the 
original Constitution argued in 1789 that a bill of rights would be pointless because political 
majorities would run roughshod over its guarantees, Thomas Jefferson responded that this 
argument ignored ‘the legal check’ that could be exercised by the judiciary. When James 
Madison faced similar concerns when he introduced the Bill of Rights in the first Congress, 
he maintained that ‘independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves . . . the 
guardians of those rights [and] . . . will be naturally led to resist every encroachment’ upon 
them. And in Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton stated that constitutional protections and 
limitations could ‘be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts 
of justice,’ which must ‘guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects 
of those ill humours which . . . sometimes disseminate among the people themselves.’” ). 
 13 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 82–83 (1990); Edwin Meese, III, 
The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 455, 464 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
862 (1989). 
 14 See generally ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi 
ed., 2007). 
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judicial intervention.15 Such an approach, conservatives argue, both sets forth 
the Constitution as a document that creates binding law16 and constrains judges 
from using the law to effectuate policy preferences.17 (Because originalism now 
holds such preeminence in conservative legal thought, this Article refers to that 
strand of conservative constitutionalism unless otherwise noted.)  
B. Progressive Constitutionalism 
There are probably as many accounts of progressive constitutionalism as 
there are progressives,18 and I do not pretend to offer the definitive account 
here. In presenting the progressive account, however, I will rely on an essay 
entitled The Framers’ Constitution19 that Geoffrey Stone and I recently 
published because it presents an approach that is commonly associated with the 
progressive account.20  
The constitutional theory that we identify has two major components. The 
first traces back almost two centuries to Chief Justice John Marshall when he 
stated in McCulloch v. Maryland21 that “we must never forget, that it is a 
constitution we are expounding,”22 and it is “intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.”23 As Marshall recognized, the Framers were visionaries who 
understood that the application of the principles they established would 
necessarily evolve over time. Accordingly, they strived “to establish the 
foundational principles that would sustain and guide the new nation into an 
uncertain future,”24 and were not, as the originalist account implies, so 
shortsighted that they sought “only to address the specific challenges facing the 
                                                                                                                       
 15 Scalia, supra note 13, at 854. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2576 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 18 Cf. P.J. O’BRIEN, WILL ROGERS: AMBASSADOR OF GOOD WILL, PRINCE OF WIT AND 
WISDOM 162 (1935) (quoting Will Rogers’s famous line, “I am not a member of any 
organized party—I am a Democrat.”).  
 19 Stone & Marshall, supra note 12, at 61. I use The Framers’ Constitution with some 
trepidation because our effort in authoring the piece was not to create a theory of 
“progressive constitutionalism” as much as it was to identify the theory that most accurately 
captures the Constitution’s design and purpose. I understand, however, that those not swayed 
to the notion that our essay accurately reflects the Framers’ vision might be inclined to view 
our account as progressive.  
 20 For a progressive theory of constitutionalism based upon originalist principles, see 
James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 1523 (2011). See also Doug Kendall & Jim Ryan, The Case for New Textualism, 
DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS, Summer 2011, at 66, 71, available at 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/21/the_case_for_new_textualism.pdf. 
 21 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 22 Id. at 407. 
 23 Id. at 415. 
 24 Stone & Marshall, supra note 12, at 61. 
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nation during their lifetimes.”25 For this reason, Geoffrey Stone and I suggest, 
the Framers deliberately used broad language such as “freedom of speech,”26 
“due process of law,”27 and “equal protection of the laws”28 in order to entrust 
“future generations [with] the responsibility to draw upon their intelligence, 
judgment, and experience to give concrete meaning to these broad principles 
over time.”29 The first component of progressive constitutionalism then is the 
understanding that “[t]he principles enshrined in the Constitution do not change 
over time. But the application of those principles must evolve as society 
changes and as experience informs our understanding.”30 
The second component of The Framers’ Constitution addresses how courts 
should provide concrete meaning to the Constitution’s open-textured provisions. 
Proceeding from Chief Justice Marshall’s understanding in McCulloch, as well 
as the Court’s decision in Carolene Products31 and the work of John Hart Ely,32 
Stone and I contend that this answer has two elements. First, because the 
Constitution is based upon principles of democratic government, “courts must 
generally defer to the preferences of the majority.”33 Second, when there are 
specific reasons to question majoritarian action, such as laws that adversely 
affect minorities who may otherwise not have a fair chance to succeed in the 
democratic process, or laws that call into question the legitimacy of the 
democratic processes themselves, heightened judicial scrutiny is required.34 
                                                                                                                       
 25 Id. 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 27 Id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 28 Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be 
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation 
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the 
first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within 
the Fourteenth. It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those 
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . Nor 
need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at 
particular religious, or national, or racial minorities[;] whether prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 32 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 3–
9, 135–36 (1980). 
 33 Stone & Marshall, supra note 12, at 62. 
 34 Id. (“[R]espect for the Framers’ Constitution requires us to recognize that although 
the Framers thought majority rule to be the best system of government, they knew it to be 
imperfect. They understood that political majorities may be tempted to enact laws that 
entrench their own authority; that in times of crisis people may panic and too readily 
sacrifice both fundamental freedoms and structural limitations; and that prejudice, hostility, 
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Progressive constitutionalism, then, is based upon the understanding of when 
the democratic process requires judicial intervention. In most circumstances, 
judicial intrusion is not necessary. But when the product of the democratic 
processes may be suspect, judicial involvement is required. 
C. Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism Contrasted 
The previous discussions might suggest that progressive constitutionalism 
has more in common with its conservative counterparts than is normally 
thought. First, like the conservatives’ judicial restraint account, progressive 
constitutionalism recognizes the constitutional importance of courts deferring to 
the actions of elected officials. It only suggests that courts should also be 
attuned to when such deference is not warranted. Second, like originalism, 
progressive constitutionalism recognizes that the principles enshrined in the 
Constitution are constant. Unlike originalism, however, progressive 
constitutionalism recognizes that fulfilling the Framers’ vision requires 
recognizing that the application of those principles may change over time.  
Some commentators have described this difference as essentially one 
involving levels of abstraction.35 Conservatives interpret constitutional 
provisions at a relatively narrow level of abstraction, tying their analyses to 
close readings of the text and so-called original meaning, while progressives 
interpret the provisions in light of broader principles.36 But the difference 
between the two approaches can be very substantial. Consider the question of 
whether the Equal Protection Clause should apply to women. Conservatives 
such as Justice Scalia argue that it should not because the record is relatively 
clear that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to include 
women within its protections.37 Progressives, in contrast, look to the 
                                                                                                                       
and intolerance may at times lead governing majorities to give short shrift to the legitimate 
needs and interests of political, religious, racial, and other minorities.”). 
 35 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential 
Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084–85 
(1981); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1926–28 (1995).  
 36 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (“For the genius of the Constitution rests 
not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the 
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.”). 
 37 Justice Scalia made this point recently in an interview with Hastings law professor 
Calvin Massey:  
Certainly the Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis of sex. The only 
issue is whether it prohibits it. It doesn’t. Nobody ever thought that that’s what it meant. 
Nobody ever voted for that. If the current society wants to outlaw discrimination by sex, 
hey we have things called legislatures, and they enact things called laws. You don’t 
need a constitution to keep things up-to-date. All you need is a legislature and a ballot 
box. 
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commitment to equality expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment and conclude 
that, in a society in which the gender distinctions that prevailed in nineteenth 
century America no longer exist, the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to 
equality cannot be fulfilled unless it is interpreted to include women.38  
III. BARNETTE, BROWN, GIDEON, AND REYNOLDS 
One of the most trenchant conservative criticisms of progressive 
constitutionalism is that it is driven by results.39 Liberal judges, according to 
this critique, are less interested in applying the rule of law than in reaching 
decisions they believe to be just or compassionate.40 This approach, it is argued, 
suffers from two central infirmities. First, it is not properly described as law 
because it is not driven by rules.41 Second, it overly empowers the unelected 
members of the judiciary to substitute their beliefs as to what is just or 
compassionate for those of democratically elected actors.42  
As it turns out, despite their protestations, the accusation of result-oriented 
jurisprudence can be as easily directed at conservatives.43 Cases such as 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,44 striking down federal affirmative 
action,45 or Citizens United v. FEC,46 finding a First Amendment right of 
corporations to spend unlimited funds to influence elections,47 for example, 
cannot be supported either by principles of judicial restraint48 or by any 
comprehensible theory of originalism.49 Yet both anti-affirmative action and 
                                                                                                                       
The Originalist, CAL. LAW., Dec. 2010–Jan. 2011, at 33, 33, available at 
http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=913358&evid=1 (selected transcript of interview 
with Justice Antonin Scalia). 
 38 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (The equal protection 
principle requires that women have “equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and 
contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities.”). 
 39 See Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 283, 287 (1996). 
 40 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Why Conservative Jurisprudence Is Compassionate, 89 
VA. L. REV. 753, 757 (2003). 
 41 Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2576 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 42 Id. 
 43 E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 89 (2009); 
William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1217, 1223 (2002). Even some conservatives appear to share this assessment. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 245 (1995) (“[O]riginalism is the legal profession’s 
orthodox mode of justification.”); BeVier, supra note 39, at 287 (suggesting that 
conservatives should be consistent).  
 44 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 45 Id. at 230. 
 46 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 47 Id. at 886. 
 48 In both cases, the Court invalidated the actions of an elected body. 
 49 The easy answer to the conservatives’ assertion in Adarand that federal affirmative 
action is unconstitutional is that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the federal 
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anti-campaign finance regulation are core features of the conservatives’ 
constitutional agenda.50  
But the failure of conservatives to live up to their own critique does not 
dispel that critique’s legitimacy. The implication that courts are guided only by 
outcomes is inconsistent with the rule of law because it suggests legal decision 
making is based upon the variable of a judge’s individual choice.51 Further, if 
there is no “law” outside judges’ outcome preferences, there is no reason why 
the decisions of unelected judges should prevail over the decisions of elected 
actors.52  
Nevertheless, simply because results alone should not control constitutional 
decision making does not mean they are irrelevant to assessing the validity of a 
constitutional theory.53 Suppose one constitutional theory leads to a set of 
                                                                                                                       
government. There is also no historical evidence indicating that the Framers of the original 
constitutional or the Civil War Amendments were concerned with preventing federal racial 
discrimination. E.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432 (1997); 
Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An 
Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 590 (1998).  
Similarly, in Citizens United, there is no basis from which to assert that the original 
meaning of the First Amendment included the right of corporations to spend unlimited funds 
to influence federal elections. The Framers greatly distrusted corporations. See Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. at 949 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It was ‘assumed that [corporations] were 
legally privileged organizations that had to be closely scrutinized by the legislature because 
their purposes had to be made consistent with public welfare.’” (quoting RONALD E. 
SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784–1855, at 5 (1982)); 
1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2:3 (3d ed. 2010) 
(noting that corporate charters were very limited and the activities of corporations tightly 
monitored during the founding era).  
 50 Other examples of result-oriented conservative jurisprudence include Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, in which Justice Scalia argued that his rule prohibiting regulatory 
takings was supported by something he termed “constitutional culture,” 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 
(1992), and Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection, which recognized a theory of judicial takings although the Framers of the 
Takings Clause would have never recognized the principle, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601–02 (2010) 
(plurality opinion).  
 51 As Judge Richard Posner has noted, “If changing judges changes law, it is not even 
clear what law is.” RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 1 (2008). 
 52 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004); James B. Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 134–35 
(1893). But see Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of 
Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 855 
(2008) (contending that judicial review performs the institutional function of providing an 
additional check on government action). 
 53 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 168–69 
(1986) (contending that outcome is not irrelevant to legitimacy). Of course, as a practical 
matter, as Sandy Levinson tells us, “When all is said and done, we place far greater 
emphasis on whether we substantively like the outcomes, than on their legal pedigree.” 
Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation 
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results that are broadly conceived to be not only correct but also landmark 
decisions reflecting the best of the American justice system, while another 
theory would suggest that those cases were wrongly decided. Does that set of 
results reflect upon the validity of the underlying theories? Should it? Focusing 
upon Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds as representative examples,54 the 
following sections examine these issues.  
A. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette55 is rightly celebrated as 
one of the greatest First Amendment decisions in American history.56 
Addressing no less an incendiary issue than American patriotism, Barnette held 
that, under the Free Speech Clause, Jehovah’s Witnesses could not be 
compelled to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance in the public 
schools.57 The fact that the case was decided at the height of World War II only 
added to the strength and courage of the decision.  
Barnette stands as a landmark decision for a number of reasons. First, the 
case is a testament to our Nation’s commitment to freedom of speech even in 
the most dire circumstances such as war.58 Second, the decision is the first to 
recognize that the right to speak should include the right to not speak.59 As the 
Court explained, compelled speech “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit 
                                                                                                                       
Proclamation Constitutional? Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1135, 1150. 
 54 Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds do not present an exhaustive list. There are 
numerous other landmark Supreme Court decisions that cannot be readily justified on 
originalist grounds but are nonetheless considered unassailable. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (ruling that the Due Process Clause requires that the state must prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) 
(holding that anti-miscegenation laws violate equal protection); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (finding a right of marital privacy); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (concluding that First Amendment protections apply to 
libel suits between private parties); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 203–04 (1962) (determining 
that redistricting cases are justiciable); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 
(1925) (deciding that parents have a constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their 
children). I selected Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds for discussion in this Article, 
however, because they are particularly illustrative in demonstrating the tension between 
originalism and landmark cases.  
 55 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 56 Gregory L. Peterson et al., Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755, 755 (2007). 
 57 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 58 For a less sanguine analysis of America’s commitment to free speech during times of 
crisis, see generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM 
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004). 
 59 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634 (stating that freedom of speech must not protect just the 
right of the individual to “speak his own mind” but also the right of the individual to be free 
from compulsion “to utter what is not in his mind”). 
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which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve 
from all official control.”60 Third, Barnette stands for the powerful proposition 
that the government may not impose a forced orthodoxy on its citizenry.61 As 
Justice Jackson wrote: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they do not now occur to us.62 
Justice Jackson’s opinion in Barnette has been described as “one of the 
greatest statements on civil liberties ever written.”63 But it was not originalist. 
The text of the First Amendment mentions only the right to speak and not the 
right not to speak.64 Furthermore, there is no historical evidence of which I am 
aware that suggests that the Framers of either the First or Fourteenth 
Amendments would have found compelled speech to be constitutionally 
problematic. The Constitution, for example, forbids religious test oaths for 
public office65 and compelled self-incrimination66 but does not impose any 
other restrictions on compulsory speech. The Fourteenth Amendment, in turn, 
was enacted against a background of loyalty oaths being imposed on Southern 
citizens67 and public schools having compulsory prayer.68 There is little to 
suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers would have seen these 
practices as unconstitutional.  
                                                                                                                       
 60 Id. at 642. 
 61 Id. The decision is further notable in that, in so deciding, the Court overturned a 
decision less than three years old. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599–
600 (1940).  
 62 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 63 KERMIT L. HALL & JOHN J. PATRICK, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS THAT SHAPED AMERICA 101 (2006). 
 64 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 65 Id. art. VI (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office or public Trust under the United States.”).  
 66 Id. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled . . . to be a witness against 
himself . . . .”).  
 67 See HAROLD MELVIN HYMAN, ERA OF THE OATH: NORTHERN LOYALTY TESTS 
DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 13 (1954) (discussing post-Civil War loyalty 
oaths). 
 68 See Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical 
Perspective, 35 EMORY L.J. 777, 782 (1986) (noting that in the nineteenth century, “[s]tate 
colleges and universities as well as elementary and secondary schools required the reading 
of the Bible and singing of hymns and saying of prayers”); see also Donahoe v. Richards, 38 
Me. 379, 413 (1854) (upholding the school board’s expulsion of a Catholic student from 
public school for refusing to read a Protestant translation of the Bible). 
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Barnette, however, is consistent with progressive constitutionalism. First, it 
follows from Carolene Products in at least two respects: it protects religious 
minorities,69 and it protects freedom of speech, the freedom that goes directly to 
the ability of the democratic processes to effectuate political change.70 Indeed, 
some writers have noted that Chief Justice Stone’s dissent in Gobitis, the case 
that Barnette overturned, was actually an extension of the Carolene Products 
opinion that he had authored the previous year.71  
Second, Barnette exemplifies progressive constitutionalism in that it shows 
how societal experience can lead to changes in how freedom of speech 
principles are applied. The idea that “[n]ational unity is the basis of national 
security”72 may seem innocuous as a justification for requiring school children 
to salute the flag. But this rationale takes on an entirely different connotation in 
the face of a war against a totalitarian regime. Against the background of 
Nazism, the reason why compelled flag salutes are such a threat to individual 
freedom becomes graphically clear.73 Accordingly, under this understanding, 
when Barnette strikes down compulsory flag salutes (even though an originalist 
would not do so), it is not rewriting the First Amendment. It is instead 
recognizing that applications of the First Amendment must change to 
accommodate the lessons learned through the experience of history.  
B. Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
The centrality of Brown v. Board of Education74 to our constitutional 
system is, of course, indisputable, and its significance cannot be overstated. As 
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson states, “Brown may be the most important political, 
social, and legal event in America’s twentieth-century history. Its greatness lay 
in the enormity of injustice it condemned, in the entrenched sentiment it 
                                                                                                                       
 69 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that 
heightened scrutiny should be applied to statutes directed at religious minorities). 
 70 Id. (noting that heightened scrutiny should be applied to “legislation which restricts 
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation,” such as “restrictions upon the right to vote,” “restraints upon the 
dissemination of information,” “interferences with political organizations,” and prohibitions 
“of peaceable assembly”); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS 
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 63 (1948) (noting the critical role of freedom of speech in 
self-government). 
 71 Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 409, 418 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
 72 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940). 
 73 The Barnette Court’s concern with totalitarianism may not have been the only factor 
that influenced its decision. The Court may also have been affected by the outbreak of 
vigilante violence against the Jehovah’s Witnesses that took place in the wake of Gobitis. 
See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 71, at 420–21. 
 74 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
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challenged, in the immensity of law it both created and overthrew.”75 As such, 
the decision is rightly celebrated as having “epoch-making significance in the 
evolution of constitutional democracy.”76 
The legal correctness of the decision is also beyond dispute. As Stephen 
Carter states, “Brown is the single unimpeachable opinion of our times; no 
constitutional theory that denies its correctness will be admitted to the 
mainstream.”77 Indeed, the case has become so central to our understanding of 
race and equal protection that the Court’s recent debate over whether a city 
program designed to promote integration in its public schools was 
unconstitutional was reasoned more on the basis of whether that program was 
consistent with Brown than whether the program was consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause.78 
Unlike the other cases discussed in this section, some commentators have 
attempted to argue that Brown can be explained on originalist grounds. The 
consensus among legal scholars and academics, however, is that these efforts 
have not succeeded.79 Consider the efforts of Robert Bork. In The Tempting of 
America, Bork concedes that “[t]he inescapable fact is that those who ratified 
the amendment did not think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in 
any aspect of life.”80 But recognizing the moral rightness of the decision, Bork 
goes on to argue that Brown’s result was nevertheless compelled by the original 
                                                                                                                       
 75 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978, at 6 (1979). 
 76 Alfred H. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED 
THE CONSTITUTION 307, 333 (John A. Garraty ed., 1987). 
 77 Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led the People to 
Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759, 777 (1991); see also Jamal Greene, How 
Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183 (2011).  
 78 Compare Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, which cites Brown for the proposition that race 
cannot be used to assign children to the public schools, 551 U.S. 701, 746–47 (2007), with 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion contending that the Chief Justice fundamentally 
misunderstood the Brown decision, id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., Joel 
K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s Reinterpretation of 
Brown, 69 OHIO. ST. L.J. 791, 792–93 (2008) (noting the efforts of the majority opinion in 
Parents Involved to tie its conclusion that benign race-based classifications were 
impermissible to the principles enunciated in Brown); Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame: 
Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939, 1004–06 (2008) (noting more broadly the 
attempts of the Justices to rely heavily on Brown in deciding equal protection cases). 
 79 See Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. 
COMMENT. 411, 436 (1998). Ironically, as David Strauss argues, the conservatives may face 
a greater problem in defending originalism if they had successfully demonstrated that Brown 
was compelled by originalist principles. David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be 
Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969, 971 (2008). If so, Strauss asks, then why did 
it take so long after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment for the Court to uncover the 
originalist understanding? Id.  
 80 BORK, supra note 13, at 75–76. 
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understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.81 But 
where does that original understanding come from if the conclusion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers did not intend to outlaw segregation was 
“inescapable”? Bork’s answer is that it was clear by the time Brown was 
decided that “segregation rarely if ever produced equality,” so the Court had to 
step in to further equality goals.82 In other words, Bork argues that the meaning 
of equality had to be reinterpreted in light of the understanding of equality of 
the society at the time of the Brown decision rather than the understanding that 
existed at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The notion 
that the meanings of constitutional provisions change over time, however, is not 
originalism.83  
Although Brown cannot be readily defended on originalist grounds, if at all, 
it is easily characterized as an example of progressive constitutionalism. To 
begin with, it stands as virtually the paradigm case under Carolene Products 
because it addresses government action directed against racial minorities84 and, 
in fact, Brown has been described in the literature as such.85 
It also stands as a paradigmatic case as to how the meaning of constitutional 
provisions can change as societal circumstances evolve. Racial segregation had 
always been reprehensible but its grotesqueness became even clearer after a war 
                                                                                                                       
 81 Id. at 82. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Michael McConnell has also attempted to defend Brown on originalist grounds. 
Focusing on congressional debates in the 1870s concerning the passage of the Federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, McConnell demonstrates that many of the legislators who voted for the 
Fourteenth Amendment subsequently supported school desegregation. See Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 984–86 
(1995). As Michael Klarman explains, however, there are a number of weaknesses in 
McConnell’s argument that this evidence establishes that the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited segregation. Klarman, supra note 35, at 1884. First, the 
debates over the Civil Rights Act were not contemporaneous with the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and there may have been some change in sentiment between the 
proposal of the Fourteenth in 1866 and the votes on the Civil Rights Act in 1875. Id. Second, 
McConnell does not explain why the key evidence in determining the underlying intent of 
the Fourteenth Amendment should be congressional votes on a subsequent statute rather than 
an account of popular sentiment regarding segregation or the beliefs of the state legislators 
who ratified the amendment. Id. Third, McConnell looks only at the congressional members’ 
statements of legal principle rather than the actual practice of segregation that existed at the 
time. Id. Fourth, Klarman argues that it is not clear that the language debated in the Civil 
Rights Act providing that blacks could not be denied “full and equal enjoyment” meant 
mandatory desegregation. Id. 
 84 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that 
heightened judicial scrutiny should be applied to statutes directed at particular religious, 
national, or racial minorities).  
 85 See David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 
1251 (“The theory of the Carolene Products footnote unifies some of the greatest successes 
in the Court’s history: Brown v. Board of Education, the ‘one person, one vote’ decisions, 
and the expansion of the free speech rights of political dissidents.”).  
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in which American soldiers of all colors fought in common cause against an 
enemy defined by its commitment to racial subordination.86 If the meaning of 
equal protection of the laws had ever supported a notion of separate but equal, it 
could not continue do to so in post-World War II America.87 Equality could no 
longer be understood to mean “separate but equal” because the meaning of 
equality had changed. 
C. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 
In Gideon v. Wainwright,88 the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment requires that criminal defendants be given state-appointed 
counsel.89 Gideon is the stuff of legend. The case’s compelling facts—the story 
of an innocent prisoner litigating his own case90—inspired both a book91 and a 
motion picture.92  
But the significance of the case extends far beyond the story’s drama.93 The 
case has become the central decision in our conception of American justice. As 
David Cole explains: 
                                                                                                                       
 86 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 174 (2004) (“[R]evulsion against fascism had 
impelled many Americans to reconsider the meaning of democracy, with unavoidable racial 
implications. The commitment of Nazis to Aryan supremacy helped ‘give racism a bad 
name’ in the United States.”). 
 87 By the time of Brown, President Truman had already ordered the desegregation of 
the U.S. Armed Forces. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948). 
 88 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 89 Id. at 342–43. 
 90 Clarence Earl Gideon was arrested and charged with breaking and entering with 
intent to commit petty larceny based only on one witness’s testimony. See Anthony Lewis, 
The Case of the Florida Drifter, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 76, at 335, 335–36. He requested a court-appointed attorney and was denied. Id. He 
defended himself and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. Id. Using the 
prison library, he hand-wrote his appeals to the Supreme Court. See id. at 341–42. He was 
then assigned a prominent attorney (Abe Fortas) for the appeal who later became a Supreme 
Court Justice. Id. When Gideon was later tried with the assistance of a court-appointed 
lawyer, he was acquitted. See id. at 347. 
 91 ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964). 
 92 Hallmark Hall of Fame: Gideon’s Trumpet (Hallmark Hall of Fame Productions 
Apr. 30, 1980). Details about the motion picture may be found at Gideon’s Trumpet, 
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080789/ (last visited Sept. 10, 
2011). 
 93 Geoffrey Hazard, for example, described the case as the leading decision of the 
1960s—a decade that included, among others, Miranda, the reapportionment cases, the 
school prayer decisions, and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Hazard, supra note 53, at 157. 
To be sure, Chief Justice Warren may not have agreed with Professor Hazard’s assessment 
that Gideon was the most important case of the 1960s, as Warren is noted to have stated that 
the reapportionment cases were the most significant of his tenure. HALL & PATRICK, supra 
note 63, at 139. 
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[T]he right recognized in Gideon is critical to perhaps the central premise of 
the American criminal justice system—the promise of equal treatment. As long 
as the rich could hire lawyers and the poor had to do without, the promise that 
all are “equal before the law” was patently illusory.94 
To be sure, Gideon did not create a right to court-appointed counsel from 
whole cloth. Powell v. Alabama95 had suggested that such a right existed in 
capital cases,96 and Betts v. Brady97 indicated that a right to counsel might exist 
depending upon the circumstances of the case.98 Moreover, because Johnson v. 
Zerbst99 had already held that there was a right to court-appointed counsel in 
federal cases,100 the actual question in Gideon was only the relatively narrow 
issue of whether that right should be incorporated to apply against the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.101 Gideon, of course, held that it did.102  
Although enjoying some precedential support, Gideon was not 
originalist.103 The Sixth Amendment’s provision allowing a right to counsel 
was enacted in response to an English common law rule that had provided that 
felons could not have counsel,104 not that the state had an affirmative obligation 
to provide such counsel.105 Any right to court-appointed counsel, as the Court 
had noted in Betts, “was dealt with by statute rather than constitutional 
provision,” and even at that there were very few instances where such assistance 
was provided.106  
Gideon, however, is another instance of progressive constitutionalism. To 
be sure, the class of criminal defendants that the case represents is not explicitly 
mentioned in Carolene Products. But it does comfortably fit within the 
                                                                                                                       
 94 David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises, 
in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 101, 102 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). 
 95 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 96 See id. at 71. 
 97 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 98 Id. at 473. 
 99 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 100 Id. at 463. 
 101 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963). 
 102 Id. at 341. 
 103 Perhaps, for this reason, the conservative endorsement of Gideon has not always 
been whole-hearted. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1495 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Even assuming the validity of [Gideon], I reject the significant further 
extension that the Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence, would create.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 104 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (“Originally, in England, a person 
charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal 
questions which the accused himself might suggest.”). 
 105 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Sixth Amendment as 
originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel, 
or to use volunteered services of counsel.” (citing United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 
173 (1891))). 
 106 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467 (1942). 
1266 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:6 
 
Carolene Products description of the type of discrete and insular minority 
entitled to heightened judicial review.107 As Geoffrey Hazard argues, Gideon 
involved the legal claim of a person “in a legally second class position, a 
position that was the product of social disparagement reinforced by legal 
institutions.”108 
Gideon also reflects the progressive understanding of how constitutional 
guarantees should be applied to meet existing conditions. The record in Gideon 
indicated that the defendant may not have been convicted if he had had the 
services of a lawyer because he (Gideon) did not raise objections to the 
prosecution’s evidence or take other procedural actions that would have 
benefitted his case in his self-representation. 109 Gideon’s conviction, in short, 
was based more on his lack of resources than whether he was guilty or innocent. 
The broad question the case posed before the Court, then, was whether the 
fairness of the American justice system should rest on whether a defendant had 
the ability to hire a lawyer. The Court held that it could not: “[R]eason and 
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal 
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. . . . [L]awyers in criminal 
courts are necessities, not luxuries.”110  
As noted above, this understanding of what was required for a fair trial was 
not originalist. Indeed, Gideon’s counsel, Abe Fortas, did not even attempt to 
contend otherwise.111 It did, however, reflect reality. As Anthony Lewis writes, 
“originally the Sixth Amendment was almost certainly not designed to reach the 
problem of a person too poor to retain a lawyer. But by the twentieth century 
that was the problem.”112 At the time of Gideon’s appeal, for example, 5093 of 
the 7836 prisoners in custody in Florida had been tried without the benefit of 
counsel.113 The adversary system upon which American justice is based, in 
short, could not accurately be characterized as fair—or even adversarial—
because only the prosecution’s side had the necessary resources.114 As such, the 
actual state of the American justice system did not reflect the principles of 
fairness and equality before the law that the Constitution requires.115 Gideon, 
then, sought to promote fealty to these principles by requiring a right to counsel 
even though there was no originalist basis to do so.116 
                                                                                                                       
 107 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that 
heightened scrutiny should apply to legislation directed at discrete and insular minorities). 
 108 Hazard, supra note 53, at 157. 
 109 See Lewis, supra note 90, at 342. 
 110 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 111 Lewis, supra note 90, at 346.  
 112 Id. at 338. 
 113 Id. at 343. 
 114 See id. at 344. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
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D. Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 
Reynolds v. Sims117 adopted the principle of one person, one vote118 as the 
central legal framework from which to evaluate the constitutionality of 
legislative apportionment,119 and in doing so rewrote the rules of American 
democracy.120 Along with its companion cases, Reynolds called into question 
ninety percent of the districts in the federal House of Representatives and a vast 
majority of the seats in all of the state legislatures.121  
Not surprisingly, the decision was highly controversial. Everett Dirksen, the 
highly respected Republican Senate Leader, for example, proposed that the case 
be overturned by constitutional amendment.122 But the outcry over Reynolds 
was relatively short-lived. As Lucas Powe notes, “Reynolds went from 
debatable in 1964 to unquestionable in 1968.”123 And today, as David Strauss 
writes, “‘one person, one vote’ might seem like a natural, even inevitable 
requirement of the Constitution.”124  
Reynolds, however, cannot be defended on originalist grounds. As Justice 
Harlan stated in his dissent: 
The history of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
conclusive evidence that neither those who proposed nor those who ratified the 
Amendment believed that the Equal Protection Clause limited the power of the 
States to apportion their legislatures as they saw fit. Moreover, the history 
demonstrates that the intention to leave this power undisturbed was deliberate 
and was widely believed to be essential to the adoption of the Amendment.125  
Harlan’s point is well-taken. To begin with, state legislative districts were 
not equally apportioned at the time of the passage of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                       
 117 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 118 See id. at 568. Reynolds does not actually use the term “one person, one vote” in its 
opinion, although that is the effect of its ruling. The actual language actually comes from a 
different case, Gray v. Sanders, in which the Court stated: “The conception of political 
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the 
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, 
one vote.” 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
 119 Gray, 372 U.S. at 380–81. 
 120 See Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 71, at 271, 296 (Reynolds, when decided, “was 
an earth-shattering decision.”). Equally significant to Reynolds in reframing the American 
electoral landscape was Baker v. Carr, the precursor case to Reynolds holding that 
reapportionment issues were justiciable. 369 U.S. 186, 203–04 (1962).  
 121 Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra note 120, at 296. 
 122 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 254 (2000). 
 123 Id. at 255. 
 124 Strauss, supra note 85, at 1260. 
 125 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 595 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Amendment, and that did not appear to raise any constitutional concern.126 State 
legislators, moreover, were also not likely to vote to ratify a constitutional 
amendment that would place their seats at risk.  
Equally significantly, the structure of the Constitution itself makes it clear 
that one person, one vote was not in the original design.127 The United States 
Senate, for example, is not apportioned according to population. This means 
that a voter in Wyoming, according to the recent census, will have sixty-six 
times more voting power over who becomes her next senator than will a voter 
of the state of California.128 Similarly, neither the Electoral College system129 
nor the Twelfth Amendment’s provision governing the election of the President 
when no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes130 meets one 
person, one vote standards. 
Finally, Reynolds is also not originalist in that it is not even clear that the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it even applied to voting. 
After all, if the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of every citizen to 
vote equally, there would have been no need to promulgate the Fifteenth 
Amendment.131 Reynolds, then, according to the originalists, must assuredly be 
wrong.132  
But Reynolds v. Sims is correct under progressive constitutionalism. To 
begin with, it involves the problem with majoritarian entrenchment specifically 
                                                                                                                       
 126 Strauss, supra note 85, at 1260. As Justice Harlan stated: “Can it be seriously 
contended that the legislatures of these States, almost two-thirds of those concerned, would 
have ratified an amendment which might render their own States’ constitutions 
unconstitutional?” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 603 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 127 The Senate apportionment set forth in the original Constitution was reaffirmed by the 
Seventeenth Amendment, which in providing for the direct election of senators by the 
people, continued to apportion two senators for each state. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 128 As of the 2010 census, Wyoming has a population of 563,626 and California has 
37,253,956 people, but both states have the same number of senators. See Resident 
Population Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/ 
apportionment-pop-text.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 129 South Dakota’s three electoral votes for a population of 814,180 give it more voting 
power in the Electoral College per capita than does the state of Texas with a population of 
25,145,561 and thirty-eight votes in the Electoral College. Hence, a voter in South Dakota, 
under the Electoral College, has over twice the voting power as a voter in Texas. See id. 
 130 The Twelfth Amendment provides that if no presidential candidate received a 
majority of electoral votes, the election is sent to the House of Representatives where each 
state is entitled to one vote. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. This means that California and 
Wyoming will have exactly the same voting power to elect the President despite their 
difference in population.  
 131 See id. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”). 
 132 See BORK, supra note 13, at 89–90 (stating that one person, one vote was 
“illegitimate constitutional law”). 
2011] SIGNIFICANCE OF LANDMARK DECISIONS 1269 
 
addressed in the Carolene Products footnote.133 The political reality is that 
legislators would likely never remedy the process that solidifies their hold on 
their seats without external judicial involvement.134  
Furthermore, Reynolds, like Brown, is an example of the Court responding 
to changes in the meaning of equality triggered by societal change. The idea 
that voting equality could mean one person, one vote would not have been 
apparent to the Framers. There were too many restrictions on the franchise. At 
the time of the framing, for example, the right to vote was limited by numerous 
criteria such as race, gender, age, and property ownership, meaning that a major 
portion of even the white male population could not vote.135 Women did not 
receive the right to vote until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 
1920.136 African-Americans, meanwhile, were not given the right to vote until 
1870 through the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.137 But even then this 
right was more theoretical than real. Because of the black disenfranchisement 
that occurred throughout the South in the late nineteenth century,138 the actual 
right of blacks to vote was not truly secured until the 1960s.139 
The achievement of universal suffrage that culminated in the 1960s, 
however, did more than expand the franchise. It also made the voting disparities 
inherent in malappropriation more obvious. If every person had the right to 
vote, then it followed from the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause that all 
persons should be entitled to vote equally. One person, one vote may not have 
been originalist, but it did reflect the most logical view of voting equality in a 
society committed to universal suffrage.140  
                                                                                                                       
 133 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Heightened 
scrutiny should be applied to “legislation which restricts those political processes which can 
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” such as “restrictions 
upon the right to vote.”). 
 134 See Strauss, supra note 85, at 1261 (contending that Reynolds and the 
reapportionment cases are amongst the great success stories of Carolene Products). 
 135 See Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote—One 
Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4. Universal white male suffrage was not realized 
until the middle of the nineteenth century. Id. 
 136 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 137 See id. amend. XV, § 1. 
 138 See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 90 (rev. 2d ed. 2002) (“[B]y the first decade of the twentieth 
century, virtually all black voters had been eliminated from the rolls across the South, 
through a combination of force and the imposition of restrictive (and often fraudulently 
administered) voting qualifications. In Louisiana, for example, there were 127,923 black 
voters and 126,884 white voters on the registration rolls in 1888 (the population of the state 
was about fifty percent black); by 1910 only 730 blacks (less than 0.5 percent of the adult 
male population) were still registered.”).  
 139 See Auerbach, supra note 135, at 4. 
 140 As President John F. Kennedy stated, “The right to fair representation and to have 
each vote count equally . . . is, it seems to me, basic to the successful operation of a 
democracy.” BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME 
COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 425 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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IV. CAN BARNETTE, BROWN, GIDEON, AND REYNOLDS BE RECONCILED 
WITH ORIGINALISM? 
As discussed in Part III, Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds are not 
originalist decisions. Yet all four cases are hailed as among the most important 
and foundational decisions in American constitutional history.141 This leads to 
two obvious questions: Can these landmark decisions somehow be reconciled 
with originalism, and, if not, does the fact that originalism does not support 
decisions that lie at the heart of our constitutional understanding suggest that the 
interpretive theory is fundamentally flawed? The following subsections discuss 
these issues.  
A. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds Are Examples of Judicial 
Exceptionalism 
A first response might be to argue that Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and 
Reynolds and originalism are actually not in conflict and can be reconciled by 
an understanding of judicial exceptionalism. For better or worse, in exigent 
circumstances, courts are sometimes called upon to do more than apply the 
law.142 Judge Posner, for example, has defended Bush v. Gore143 on exactly 
these grounds, contending that the Court may have decided to act as it did in 
order to avoid the impending chaos that would have faced the nation had the 
results of the presidential election continued to remain in doubt.144  
If we accept the possibility that courts must or may occasionally act outside 
the bounds of legal strictures in order to effectuate “rough justice,”145 to use 
                                                                                                                       
 141 This is not to say that the cases are free from all criticism. Some have argued, for 
example, that Brown may have slowed the progress of civil rights by creating a backlash, see 
KLARMAN, supra note 86, at 350; that the promise of equal justice in Gideon remains only a 
promise because the courts have failed to assure that court-appointed counsel are actually 
effective, see Cole, supra note 94, at 128; that Reynolds’s mathematical reliance on one 
person, one vote undermines the ability of the state to protect group interests through the 
apportionment process, see Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY 
L.J. 869, 883–84 (1995); and that Barnette overstates the limitation on the authority of the 
government to promote community hegemony, see Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 630–32 (2003).  
 142 See William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court, Bush v. Gore, and Rough Justice, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787, 788–89 (2001). 
 143 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 144 See Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election 
Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 46. As Judge Posner explains, a 
continued and unresolved recount would have led to “a real and disturbing potential for 
disorder and temporary paralysis.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 145 See id. at 60 (contending that Bush v. Gore may be an example of a case in which the 
Court majority may have attempted to achieve “rough justice” rather than strictly applying 
legal doctrine). Bush v. Gore may not be the only such example. As I have written 
elsewhere, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), might be understood more 
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Judge Posner’s term, then an argument could be constructed that originalism 
and Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds are reconcilable if the particular 
demands of these cases were such that they required the Court to engage in 
judicial exceptionalism. If so, the correctness of those cases does not mean that 
originalism is invalid. It only means that a court, in exceptional circumstances, 
may veer from an otherwise jurisprudentially-sound philosophy.146  
Certainly there are reasons that support why a court could believe that 
Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds were exceptional cases requiring 
extraordinary legal measures. All four cases are, after all, exceptional— 
especially Brown—because of their moral and political imperatives.147 Indeed, 
that is why they are universally celebrated.148  
More specific reasons also support the proposition that these cases raised 
particularly compelling reasons for judicial intervention. The malapportionment 
addressed in Reynolds, for example, likely never would have been resolved 
without judicial review. Political bodies, after all, are unlikely to change the 
rules that secure their own entrenchment.149 Brown and Barnette, in turn, had 
major implications for United States foreign relations. Brown was arguably 
necessary to send a message to the world at the height of the Cold War about 
the commitment of the United States to civil liberties and racial justice,150 
thereby undercutting Soviet propaganda efforts to bring the third world into its 
                                                                                                                       
as an effort of the Court to effectuate rough justice by protecting news media from 
debilitating damage verdicts in order to preserve the viability of the civil rights movement in 
the South than as a dispassionate First Amendment assessment of libel laws. See Marshall, 
supra note 142, at 791–94. 
 146 Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer make a similar point in reference to 
Abraham Lincoln’s rejection of the rule of law in suspending habeas corpus:  
If it was important for winning the Civil War that Lincoln suspend habeas corpus and 
infringe on other civil liberties, then the moral importance of winning the war was 
sufficient to justify his actions. Reaching this conclusion . . . does not mean that 
suspending habeas corpus was right. It just means that this wrong was outweighed by 
the greater wrong that would have occurred had the war been lost.  
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1382 (1997) (footnote omitted); see also Levinson, supra note 53, at 
1135 (discussing the constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation). 
 147 Robert Bork, for example, called Brown “the greatest moral triumph constitutional 
law had ever produced.” BORK, supra note 13, at 77. Earl Warren, in turn, stated that 
Reynolds, along with Baker v. Carr, were “the most important ones decided during his 
sixteen years as the chief justice.” HALL & PATRICK, supra note 63, at 139. 
 148 See supra Part III. 
 149 Cf. Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. 
L. REV. 747, 757 (1991) (“It is difficult to imagine a more compelling case for judicial 
intervention on political process grounds than [a reapportionment case].”). Klarman’s quote 
refers specifically to Baker v. Carr, the pre-Reynolds decision that held apportionment issues 
were justiciable. 369 U.S. 186, 203–04 (1962). 
 150 Cf. Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response 
to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (2006).  
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orbit.151 Barnette sent the wartime message to World War II allies and enemies 
just exactly what was at stake in the conflict: In stark contrast to the totalitarian 
practices of Hitler’s Germany, American citizens had the constitutional freedom 
to refuse to submit to compelled allegiance.152 In both cases, then, a court might 
believe that extraordinary legal action was needed in order to further American 
interests abroad at critical moments in American history. Even Gideon 
communicated a message of an alternative to a world considering communism 
as a method to redress enormous wealth inequalities. As one writer said of 
Gideon, “No tale so affirmed the American democracy. No story broadcast 
around the world so clearly proclaimed that not just the rich received justice in 
American courts.”153 
Reconciling Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds with originalism under 
a theory of judicial exceptionalism, however, seems awkward. To begin with, 
one of the major attractions of originalism is that it rigidly purports not to bend 
to the demands of exigency.154 Suggesting that originalism allows for courts to 
pursue rough justice, then, is inconsistent with originalism’s basic conviction.  
Second, the premise of judicial exceptionalism, in turn, is that it should be 
employed in only the rarest of instances.155 Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and 
Reynolds, however, cover vast expanses of constitutional law territory. To 
contend that those cases stand as exceptions to what constitutional law normally 
requires is to suggest that much of constitutional law is based upon exceptions 
to what the law actually requires. 
B. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds Are Super Precedents  
A second argument might suggest that our four cases and originalism are 
not in conflict because their “correctness” is not based upon legal principle but 
upon the status that they have attained as precedents.156 That is, the decisions in 
the cases may have not been legally correct when decided, but their universal 
acceptance ex post makes them unassailable. Viewing the decisions in this 
manner brings to mind Michael Gerhardt’s discussion of “super precedents,” or 
“foundational decisions,” that are less susceptible to being overruled precisely 
                                                                                                                       
 151 See KLARMAN, supra note 86, at 291 (“The ensuing Cold War pressured Americans 
to reform their racial practices in order to convince nonwhite Third World nations that they 
should not equate democratic capitalism with white supremacy.”). 
 152 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).  
 153 ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 405–06 (1997). 
 154 See Wilkinson, supra note 40, at 758–60. But see William P. Marshall, The Empty 
Promise of Compassionate Conservatism: A Reply to Judge Wilkinson, 90 VA. L. REV. 355, 
364–70 (2004) (presenting examples where conservative jurists have bent the rules in order 
to reach conservative results). 
 155 Bush v. Gore, for example, went out of the way to limit the scope of its decision 
indicating that the precedential effect of the case might be “limited to the present 
circumstances.” See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam). 
 156 Indeed, some support for this proposition may be found from the fact that the cases 
were not considered uncontroversial when decided. 
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because of the special role they play in the constitutional culture.157 Gerhardt 
describes the class of super precedents as follows: 
Supreme Court decisions on discrete questions of constitutional law that (1) 
have endured over time; (2) political institutions repeatedly have endorsed and 
supported; (3) have influenced or shaped doctrine in at least one area of 
constitutional law; (4) have enjoyed, in one form or another, widespread social 
acquiescence; and (5) are widely recognized by the courts as no longer 
meriting the expenditure of scarce judicial resources.158 
As he explains, such precedents become so deeply enmeshed in the social 
landscape, and there has been so much social, political, and economic reliance 
upon them, that overturning them, even if it is believed that they were wrongly 
decided, becomes “unthinkable.”159  
One can debate whether our four cases qualify as super precedent under 
Gerhardt’s criteria. Brown (certainly yes), Reynolds (likely yes in some form), 
Gideon (maybe), Barnette (maybe not), but the more interesting question is 
whether a recognition of these cases as super precedents reconciles them with 
originalism. At a superficial level, of course, it does. If cases can be legally 
wrong under originalism but still be an accepted part of the constitutional fabric, 
then the validity of originalism is not undermined. It just means that “wrong” 
cases can be grandfathered in.  
Originalists, however, should not be satisfied by this answer.160 Originalism 
does not turn out to be much of a constraint if “wrong” decisions can be turned 
into correct ones by the virtue of the passage of time or social acceptance, even 
if that acceptance becomes deeply ingrained in the constitutional culture. 
Furthermore, although the intellectual validity of originalism may not be 
undermined by construing the four cases as super precedents, the strength of the 
jurisprudential commitment to implementing the theory is weakened by an 
account that suggests the theory’s strictures can be effectively bypassed. 
                                                                                                                       
 157 Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1208–09 (2006). 
Gerhardt’s excellent piece also recognizes two other types of super precedent beyond the 
foundational decisions discussed below. The first type encompasses cases like Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that establish foundational institutional practices 
such as judicial review. Gerhardt, supra, at 1209. The second type encompasses cases that 
establish foundational doctrine such as the decisions establishing the incorporation doctrine. 
Id. at 1210. His third category, the one of concern here, covers “foundational decisions,” 
meaning cases deeply ingrained in political and constitutional culture. Id. at 1213. 
 158 Gerhardt, supra note 157, at 1213. 
 159 Id. at 1214. Gerhardt uses the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 457, 553–54 
(1871), upholding the constitutionality of paper money, as his prime example for 
demonstrating this point. Gerhardt, supra note 157, at 1213–14. 
 160 Cf. Barnett, supra note 150, at 1233 (arguing that if a case was wrongly decided it 
should be overturned no matter how deeply embedded in the culture). 
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C. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds Are Wrong 
The final response is the most direct. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and 
Reynolds may be considered hallmark cases, but that is beside the point. What 
makes cases right or wrong is not societal acceptance, but correctness as a 
matter of law.161 Accordingly, if the cases cannot be justified on originalist 
grounds, they must be considered wrong, and their iconic status does not matter. 
This is not an insubstantial argument. After all, as Randy Barnett points out, 
there have been times in our constitutional history when now-universally-
condemned Supreme Court opinions had iconic stature.162 Does that mean that 
those cases were legally correct at the time? The difficulty is that if the fact that 
a decision is universally engrained in one generation’s political culture makes 
that decision legally correct, then any court decision could presumably attain 
legally correct status, depending only upon the perception of that decision by 
the attendant generation. Stated more simply, if the reason why Brown is 
considered legally correct at the beginning of the twenty-first century is because 
of its universal societal acceptance, then a case such as Plessy would have to be 
considered equally correct at the beginning of the twentieth century, assuming 
that the case held similar status during that period.163 Tying the legal 
correctness of a decision to universal societal approbation can lead to bad 
results as well as good.  
All of this, of course, is true. The status of icons can change over time. But 
if conservative constitutionalism is to reject cases such as Barnette, Brown, 
Gideon, and Reynolds, it must incur a heavy price. First, it must live with the 
results. A constitutional landscape that does not prohibit the government from 
demanding that its citizens swear oaths of allegiance regardless of their 
religious or moral objections, does not outlaw de jure segregation, does not 
grant criminal defendants the resources to have a fair trial, and does not provide 
each voter with an equal voice in her democratic institutions is a landscape that 
is bleak and unforgiving.  
Second, originalism must recognize that rejecting these cases means 
rejecting the most persuasive accounts (other than an assessment of what the 
Framers may have believed) as to what a constitutional provision means.164 
Maybe the Equal Protection Clause in 1868, for example, did not mean one 
person, one vote, but by the 1960s, the best understanding of voting equality 
was precisely that. Perhaps in 1791 compulsory flag salutes would not have 
                                                                                                                       
 161 Robert Bork explicitly makes this point in The Tempting of America: “It is no answer 
to say we like the results . . . , for that is to say that we prefer an authoritarian regime with 
which we agree to a democracy which we do not.” BORK, supra note 13, at 78. 
 162 Barnett, supra note 150, at 1245 (referring to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896)).  
 163 For a discussion of the status of Plessy in American constitutional culture during the 
early part of the twentieth century, see KLARMAN, supra note 86, at 22–23. 
 164 Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 85 (2010) 
(arguing that originalism leads to anachronistic results). 
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been seen to implicate the First Amendment, but by 1943, in the face of 
Nazism, that implication was clear. This objection is not, I should point out, an 
argument that originalism may lead to bad policy choices. Rather, it is an 
argument that originalism may lead to bad legal choices because it forces legal 
decisions to be made out of context. 
Third, originalism must concede that it projects the Framers in a 
surprisingly unfavorable light. To begin with, it suggests that the Framers were 
so shortsighted that they would have approved of this bleak constitutional 
landscape simply because the society that they lived in did not yet understand 
the fuller implications of their (the Framers’) commitment to the principles of 
equal protection of the laws, free speech, and the right to counsel that Barnette, 
Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds subsequently brought to fruition.165 And it further 
ignores that the Framers were steeped in a common law tradition that presumed 
that reason, observation, and experience would allow us to increase our 
understanding over time about the principles they set forth in the Constitution.  
Originalism does all this, moreover, with very little benefit. The perceived 
virtue of originalism, of course, is that it ostensibly constrains legal decision 
making. But originalism has not proved to be much of a constraining factor. To 
begin with, there is little, if any, indication that in the hands of conservative 
jurists, originalism has actually served to constrain. The governing rule of 
originalism seems only to be that it must be applied rigidly in every case—
except when it isn’t.166  
More fundamentally, there is little likelihood that originalism could serve to 
substantially constrain even if consistently applied. The Framers, after all, had 
no precise agreed-upon meanings of such terms as “freedom of speech,”167 “due 
process,”168 “equal protection,”169 Commerce . . . among the several States,”170 
or other such provisions.171 Their political beliefs were as diverse as our own, 
and the document they produced was a product of compromise, not unanimity. 
Originalism thus offers only a false hope of determinacy.172 And that is a very 
thin reed upon which to sacrifice cases like Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and 
Reynolds.  
                                                                                                                       
 165 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 886–88 (1985). 
 166 Marshall, supra note 43, at 1229.  
 167 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 168 Id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 169 Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 170 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 171 See Scalia, supra note 13, at 856 (noting that the historical record as to original 
meaning is often ambiguous). 
 172 A prime example of how originalism cannot definitively resolve constitutional issues 
is District of Columbia v. Heller, in which both the majority and dissent were able to present 
sound historical arguments as to whether the Second Amendment created an individual right 
to bear arms. Compare 554 U.S. 570, 598–605 (2008), with id. at 652–62 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
1276 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:6 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional theory, it is generally agreed, should not be driven by results. 
The test of the validity of any constitutional theory should be in its internal 
integrity. But what does it say about a constitutional theory if its application 
leads to a pattern of results that are problematic? One answer, of course, is to 
conclude those results are wrong. The other is to conclude that the pattern of 
results stands as evidence that the theory itself is somehow misguided.  
Originalism faces a significant challenge under this calculus because so 
many of the results to which it leads are inconsistent with decisions that are 
considered to be foundational in the American constitutional system including, 
as this Article suggests, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 
Brown v. Board of Education, Gideon v. Wainwright, and Reynolds v. Sims.  
That originalism is at odds with these cases does not definitively prove 
originalism to be invalid, although it certainly points in that direction. But it 
does demonstrate that the costs of relying on that theory may far exceed its 
benefits. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds are iconic for a reason. They 
reflect and bring meaning to the Constitution’s fundamental values of equality, 
freedom, and democratic participation. They treat the Framers as John Marshall 
treated them: as visionaries who authored a Constitution, not scriveners who 
drafted a set of rules. Any theory that would excise these decisions from our 
constitutional culture must ask, what is left in the vision of the Constitution that 
remains? 
